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2A-06/3Q/92 
STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TOWN OF HENRIETTA 
Upon a Petition for Declaratory Ruling CASE NO. DR-03 0 
BERNARD WINTERMAN, for Petitioner 
ROBERT J. FLAVIN, for CWA, Local 1170 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Communications Workers of America, Local 1170 (CWA) to a decision 
by the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) on a petition filed by the Town of Henrietta (Town) 
seeking a declaratory ruling on the negotiability of the 
following CWA demand: 
After sixteen hundred (1,600) hours have been 
accumulated of performing higher rated work 
by lower craft, the Town shall permanently 
promote to the higher rated classification 
the senior qualified employee. 
The Director ruled that the demand is a nonmandatory subject 
of negotiation because it requires the Town to create a position 
and/or fill a vacancy each time an employee has performed out-of-
title work for more than 1600 hours. 
The Director's decision addresses the material aspects of 
CWA's exceptions and we affirm his ruling for the reasons stated 
in his decision. To those, we would only add that the ruling 
does not, as CWA claims, deprive it of a right to bargain the 
Board - DR-03 0 
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compensation to be paid to employees who work out-of-title for 
any given period of time. The Director's ruling means only that 
the Town need not bargain a requirement that job positions be 
created or filled. 
For the reasons set forth above, CWA's exceptions are denied 
and the Director's ruling is affirmed. The Board, therefore, 
declares the demand in issue to be a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiation. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsel! 
u-
a, Chairperson 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ROSWELL PARK MEMORIAL INSTITUTE, LOCAL 303, 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 10 00, AFSCME, APL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-10220 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH), 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (ROBERT DeCATALDO 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (RICHARD J. DAUTNER 
of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the State of 
New York (Department of Health) (State) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After several days of hearing, 
the ALJ held that the State's imposition of a smoking ban 
affecting nonpublic office areas at the Roswell Park Memorial 
Institute (RPMI) violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) as charged by the Roswell Park Memorial 
Institute, Local 303, Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., 
Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA). 
The State argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's 
negotiability determination fails to afford sufficient weight to 
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RPMI's special mission as a comprehensive cancer care center.-7 
In conjunction with this mission argument, the State requests 
that we take notice of an accreditation standard promulgated in 
March 1991 by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health 
Organizations. The new standard, which became effective 
January 1, 1992, after the ALT's decision was issued, requires 
all accredited institutions to prohibit the use of smoking 
materials in hospital buildings. Alternatively, the State argues 
that the record should be reopened for further hearings on the 
accreditation issue. The State also argues that its contracts 
covering the RPMI employees represented by CSEA, and certain 
smoking guidelines which it developed with CSEA under those 
contracts, either divest the Board, of jurisdiction over this 
charge or establish a waiver of any further bargaining right 
regarding the promulgation and implementation of the smoking 
policies at RPMI. 
CSEA argues in response that the State's jurisdictional and 
waiver defenses were correctly rejected and that the ALJ properly 
applied our balancing test in determining that the private office 
smoking ban is a mandatory subject of negotiation. 
Before reaching any of the State's exceptions which affect 
the disposition of the charge on its merits, we address the 
-'The ALJ dismissed the charge to the extent the smoking ban 
applied to the two other areas in which employees at RPMI 
previously had been allowed to smoke because those areas 
(cafeteria and solaria) were used by patients. No exceptions 
have been filed to the ALJ's decision in this respect. 
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State's jurisdictional defense because it questions our power to 
entertain the charge.-7 
Section 2 05.5(d) of the Act denies PERB jurisdiction over 
violations of an agreement between an employer and an employee 
organization which do not otherwise constitute improper 
practices. We have held that this section of the Act is 
triggered if an agreement is a source of right to a charging 
party which would support a reasonable claim that the actions 
complained of in the improper practice charge violate that 
agreement.-' 
Having reviewed both the parties' collective bargaining 
agreement and the smoking guidelines, we find that neither is a 
source of right to CSEA with respect to the allegation in its 
charge that its unit employees are entitled to a continuation of 
smoking privileges in nonpublic office spaces within the RPMI. 
As we will detail hereafter in conjunction with the discussion of 
the State's waiver defense, the contract and the smoking 
guidelines establish a framework for the resolution of workplace 
smoking issues. In relevant respect, the smoking guidelines vest 
the State with the arguable right to take the action it did after 
having exhausted the guidelines' processes for the resolution of 
disputes over smoking policies. Thus viewed, the guidelines and 
g/Erie County Water Auth. , 25 PERB ^3017 (1992) . 
^State of New York - Unified Court System, 25 PERB f3035 
(June 30, 1992); County of Nassau, 24 PERB ^3029 (1991). 
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the contract from which they derived, represent only a source of 
right to the State which form the basis for the waiver defense we 
next address.-' 
Workplace smoking was the State's key health and safety 
issue for the negotiations which led to the parties' 1985-88 
contract.-7 Having agreed that health and safety issues were 
best discussed by committee, the parties established a State-
level committee for that purpose. That committee's deliberations 
led to Article 15 of the parties' contract entitled "Safety and 
Health Maintenance". The contract establishes a State-wide 
Safety and Health Maintenance Committee and includes the 
following among its initiatives: 
Exploration of options with respect to health 
effects of smoking in the workplace which 
shall include establishing, on a pilot basis, 
no smoking areas in state owned and leased 
buildings. 
The State-wide Safety and Health Maintenance Committee met 
after negotiations for the 1985-88 contract had ended and it 
decided that workplace smoking should be discussed with several 
of the State unions. A state-wide coalition labor-management 
-
;Having decided that we have jurisdiction over the charge for 
the reasons stated, we have no occasion to decide whether the 
smoking guidelines are the type of "agreement" to which §2 05.5(d) 
of the Act applies. 
-''CSEA represents three units of State employees who are assigned 
to the RPMI; the Administrative Services Unit (ASU), the 
Institutional Services Unit (ISU) and the Operational Services 
Unit (OSU). The relevant negotiating history and contract 
language is common to all three contracts. 
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committee was then established to discuss workplace smoking which 
included representatives of CSEA at the State level. The 
coalition committee quickly decided that the best way to address 
the many issues associated with workplace smoking was to develop 
smoking guidelines for implementation at the local level. After 
several meetings, extending over a period of months, a 
comprehensive set of smoking guidelines were developed and 
reduced to writing in a four-page document entitled "Guidelines 
for Development of Policies on Smoking in the Workplace". The 
record establishes that these smoking guidelines, issued in 
August 1986, were developed and approved jointly by the 
leadership of the State, CSEA and other unions and that its 
content reflected a compromise of initial ideas and demands. 
The guidelines recognize the hazards of smoking and express 
a mutual purpose to work toward a smoke-free environment in the 
workplace. The guidelines suggest that agencies should develop 
smoking policies which contain a general statement of purpose, an 
identification of smoking and nonsmoking areas, promotion of 
smoking cessation and other educational programs and a review of 
workplace design and ventilation. The guidelines also anticipate 
that there might be problems in establishing smoking policies and 
they create a mechanism for the resolution of such conflicts. 
Impasses were to be referred through the local labor-management 
process and to the State-wide labor management process as 
necessary. With respect to the designation of smoking and 
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nonsmoking areas, the guidelines provide that should a "good 
faith effort" through "the labor/management process" not effect a 
mutually satisfactory resolution, then "management shall have the 
responsibility to take appropriate action." 
The ALJ held that the contract and the guidelines, whether 
taken separately or together, did not establish a waiver of 
CSEA's right to bargain implementation of RPMI's smoking ban. We 
disagree and, accordingly, reverse. 
We find from our review of the record that the parties 
clearly intended through the contract and the smoking guidelines 
to establish a comprehensive program'for the development of 
smoking policies at the facility level and for the resolution of 
any disputes which might arise concerning those issues. The 
smoking guidelines were developed as a result of an agreement 
reached and codified in the parties' formal contract and 
themselves represent the parties' mutual agreement obtained 
through joint deliberation and approval. As we view the contract 
and the smoking guidelines, they represent much more than a 
convenient way to avoid dealing with the issue of workplace 
smoking at the bargaining table. Rather, we find them to have 
been the means by which the parties intended to discharge their 
mutual right and duty to bargain regarding the development and 
implementation of smoking policies at the local level. In such 
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circumstances, we hold that CSEA knowingly relinquished-7 any 
statutory right to further bargaining regarding the 
implementation of smoking policies at RPMI, substituting the 
agreements embodied in Article 15 of the contract and those 
subsequently developed in the smoking guidelines. 
Our dismissal of the charge on the basis of the State's 
waiver defense makes it unnecessary to consider the State's 
exceptions which are directed to the ALJ's negotiability 
determination. 
For the reasons set forth above, we grant such of the 
State's exceptions as are directed to a waiver defense and 
reverse the ALJ's decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pau luline R. Kinse l la , Chai rperson 
Walter, L. Eisenberg, Member 
S = € ^ 
Eric 3/ Schmertz, Member 
6/ 
-'Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. Newman, 88 A.D.2d 685, 15 PERB 
57011 (3d Dep't 1982), aff'd, 61 N.Y.2d 1001, 17 PERB 57007 
(1984) . 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 100 0, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, RENSSELAER 
LOCAL #842, HUDSON VALLEY COMMUNITY 
COLLEGE UNIT, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11843 
HUDSON VALLEY COMMUNITY COLLEGE, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (WILLIAM A. HERBERT of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
ROBERT E. GRAY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Rensselaer Local #842, Hudson Valley Community College Unit 
(CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALT). After 
hearing, the ALJ dismissed CSEA's charge against the Hudson 
Valley Community College (College) which alleges, as amended, 
that the College violated §209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it brought disciplinary 
charges under §75 of the Civil Service Law against Richard D. 
Evans, a College security officer and CSEA's unit president. The 
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ALJ held that Evans was not protected in his April 26, 1990 
investigation of a health and safety hazard which was caused by 
the College's decision to turn off its potable water supply. The 
ALJ also held that there was insufficient evidence that the 
disciplinary charges were brought against Evans because he had 
filed a safety complaint with the State's Department of Labor 
which led to the College being cited for serious violations of 
the Labor Law. Lastly, the ALJ held that the College's past 
practice regarding release time for union business was not 
changed by its order to Evans that he discontinue his safety 
investigation and return to work. 
CSEA excepts to each of the ALJ's conclusions. The College 
has not responded to CSEA's exceptions nor has it filed cross-
exceptions. 
We turn first to CSEA's argument that the College's 
disciplinary charges unilaterally changed its past practice 
regarding leave for union business and, thereby, violated its 
duty to bargain under §2 09-a.l(d) of the Act. We affirm the 
ALJ's dismissal of this aspect of the charge. The circumstances 
surrounding Evans' safety investigation and his refusal to obey 
his supervisor's return-to-work order were unique. No matter how 
unrestricted his union leave time may have been in different 
circumstances in the past, we cannot conclude that the College's 
disciplinary charges indirectly changed its union leave 
practices. We do not consider the record sufficient to prove 
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that Evans had an absolute right to union leave time whenever he 
wanted and for whatever purpose and to whatever extent he wanted. 
CSEA advances per se and improper motivation theories in 
support of its §209-a.l(a) and (c) allegations, each of which 
focuses upon a different aspect of Evans' activity on April 26 ^  
The per se theory of violation hinges upon Evans7 asserted 
protected right to refuse a return-to-work order because at the 
time the order was issued he was allegedly engaged in a 
reasonable investigation of an existing health and safety 
emergency in his capacity as unit president. The improper 
motivation theory of violation focuses upon the safety complaint 
Evans filed with the Department of Labor. Using the latter 
theory, CSEA argues that the College's real motivation for 
bringing the disciplinary charges was to retaliate against Evans 
for making that complaint, not for his having refused a 
supervisor's return-to-work order. 
As we disagree with the ALJ's conclusion that the College's 
improper motivation was not sufficiently evidenced by the record, 
we need not address the several factual and legal issues raised 
by CSEA's per se theory of violation. 
Evans' report of a safety hazard to the Department of Labor 
was protected,-'' and the College officials who prepared and 
issued the disciplinary charges against Evans knew that he had 
^City of White Plains, 22 PERB [^3 053 (1989) ; New York City 
Transit Auth., 19 PERB ^3021 (1986). 
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filed the complaint. The only remaining issue, therefore, is 
whether the College disciplined him for making that complaint. 
In dismissing CSEA's allegation that the College was 
improperly motivated in issuing the disciplinary charges against 
Evans, the ALJ herself noted that the record evidence regarding 
causation was "troublesome" for the College. In disagreement 
with the ALJ, however, we find that the unrebutted record 
evidence is sufficient to establish a violation of §209-a.l(a) 
and (c) of the Act. 
The disciplinary charges against Evans were issued by 
Dr. Marco Silvestri, the College's Senior Vice-President for 
Administration. Evans' immediate supervisor, who ordered Evans 
to return to work on the day in issue at Silvestri's direction, 
was Sidney Bailey. Silvestri was openly angry with Evans simply 
for having contacted the Department of Labor. Silvestri's anger 
first manifested itself before he knew anything about Evans' 
refusal to return to work and it continued into a meeting with 
Evans and the safety inspector from the Department of Labor later 
on April 26. Bailey did not prefer charges against Evans for 
having disobeyed his order to return to work; indeed, he was 
initially tolerant of Evans' efforts to contact the appropriate 
State and union officials about the water problem. From our 
reading of the record, it appears that even after he issued the 
return-to-work order, Bailey was only interested in getting a 
clarification for the future about the proper accommodation 
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between Evans' dual roles as the unit president and a campus 
security officer until Silvestri suggested to him on April 27 
that he prepare a written memorandum regarding the April 2 6 
incident. It was not until May 14, after the College had been 
cited for serious safety violations by the Department of Labor, 
that the College served Evans with the disciplinary charges. The 
disciplinary charges themselves further substantiate CSEA's 
allegation that the motive behind the College's disciplinary 
charges was Evans' complaint to the Department of Labor. The 
disciplinary notice contained three charges, two of which 
concerned 19 8 9 incidents which were unrelated to the April 26, 
1990 water safety issue. These two unrelated allegations of 
misconduct had been, moreover, resolved before the April 2 6 
incident by the parties' stipulation to waive their rights under 
§75 of the Civil Service Law, the very section of law under which 
the disciplinary charges against Evans were brought in May 
1990.?/ 
We believe that the inference of improper motivation which 
can reasonably be drawn from the facts noted above is stronger 
than any contrary inference which might be drawn from other 
record facts. Inasmuch as CSEA satisfied its burden of proof by 
^According to the College's answer, the hearing officer 
conducting the Civil Service Law §75 proceedings eliminated these 
specifications from the disciplinary charges against Evans. 
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a preponderance of the evidence-'' and there is insufficient 
evidence that legitimate business reasons prompted the College's 
filing of the disciplinary charges against Evans,-' we reverse 
the ALJ's decision and hold the College to have violated §209-
a.l(a) and (c) of the Act by bringing disciplinary charges 
against Evans. 
For the reasons and to the extent set forth above, we, 
therefore, reverse the ALJ's decision dismissing CSEA's charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the College: 
1. Immediately discontinue any prosecution of the 
disciplinary charges against Evans dated May 14, 1990 
and immediately remove any copies of such charges, or 
any references thereto or to the subject matters 
thereof, from any files in the custody or control of 
the College or its agents. 
2. Make Evans whole for any wages or benefits lost as a 
result of the institution or prosecution of the May 14, 
1990 disciplinary charges against him, with interest at 
the currently prevailing maximum legal rate. 
3. Cease and desist from interfering with or 
discriminating against Evans for having made health or 
-/That is the standard we have held charging parties must 
satisfy. See, e.g., State of New York (Division of Human 
Rights) , 22 PERB [^3036 (1989) . 
^Silvestri was not called to testify despite his ready 
availability. 
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safety complaints to the State Department of Labor on 
April 26, 1990. 
4. Sign and post notice in the form attached in all 
locations in which informational notices to CSEA unit 
employees are posted by the College. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
V T-> ' v-i ~~~n i U ^ Pafuline R. Kinsel la / Chairperson 
2.21 
Walteri. Eisenberg, Membe 
APPENDIX 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify -j-^g employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Rensselaer Local #842, Hudson Valley Community College Unit 
(CSEA) that Hudson Valley Community College: 
1. Will immediately discontinue any prosecution of the 
disciplinary charges against Richard D. Evans dated 
May 14, 1990 and immediately remove any copies of such 
charges, or any references thereto or to the subject 
matters thereof, from any files in the custody or 
control of the College or its agents. 
2. Will make Richard D. Evans whole for any wages or 
benefits lost as a result of the institution or 
prosecution of the May 14, 1990 disciplinary charges 
against him, with interest at the currently prevailing 
maximum legal rate. 
3. Will not interfere with or discriminate against 
Richard D. Evans for having made health or safety 
complaints to the State Department of Labor on 
April 26, 1990. 
HUDSON.VALLEY.COMMUNITY. COLLEGE. 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
COMMUNICATION WORKERS OF AMERICA, 
LOCAL 117 0, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11855 
TOWN OF HENRIETTA, 
Respondent. 
ROBERT FLAVIN, for Charging Party 
BERNARD WINTERMAN, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Town of 
Henrietta (Town) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge 
(ALJ). After hearing, the ALJ held that the Town violated §209-
a.l(a) and (c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act), as alleged by the Communication Workers of America, 
Local 117 0 (CWA), when it withdrew CWA's permission to use the 
Town's fax machine, prevented CWA from telephoning its stewards 
and unit employees at work, and removed a telephone from its 
sewer plant which unit employees had been permitted to use.-7 
The Town's exceptions are addressed only to that part of the 
ALJ's decision and order concerning the removal of the telephone 
-
yThe ALJ dismissed an allegation that the Town had violated the 
Act by instructing employees to report problems or concerns to 
their department heads before contacting CWA. No exceptions have 
been filed to this part of the ALJ's decision. 
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in the sewer plant. The ALJ held that the Town removed the 
telephone, just as it had denied CWA access to other office 
equipment and unit employees at work, to retaliate against 
employees for the grievances filed against the Town, many of 
which the Town's supervisor, James Breese, considered to be 
frivolous. 
The Town argues that its decision to remove the telephone 
was not improperly motivated, but that, in any event, it has an 
"absolute managerial right" to remove the telephone. 
Having reviewed the record, we find no reason to disturb the 
ALJ's relevant findings of fact which rest in substantial part on 
her assessment of the witnesses' credibility. Having affirmed 
the ALJ's finding that the Town's decision to remove the 
telephone was improperly motivated, its claimed managerial right 
to install, deploy, or remove its business equipment is 
immaterial. The Town may not take an action, even one within its 
managerial discretion, for reasons which the Act prohibits or 
makes improper.-1 
For the reasons set forth above, the Town's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the Town: 
1. Restore the CWA's access to the Town's fax machine. 
2. Permit the CWA to directly contact stewards and unit 
employees and leave messages for them at the workplace. 
g/Citv of Albany v. Helsby, 29 N.Y.2d 433, 5 PERB 57000 (1972). 
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3. Restore the telephone in the sewer plant. 
4. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used by the Town to communicate with unit 
employees. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
(A<t</<&z^£~ 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Memb 




THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 a l l e m p l o y e e s o f t h e T o w n o f Henrietta in the unit 
represented by the Communication Workers of America, Local 117 0 
(CWA), that the Town of Henrietta: 
1. Will restore the CWA's access to the Town's 
fax machine. 
2. Will permit the CWA to directly contact 
stewards and unit employees and leave 
messages for them at the workplace. 
3. Will restore the telephone in the sewer 
plant. 
. TDWN. .OF. .HENRIETTA 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, APSCME, APL-CIO (CAPITAL REGION 
JUDICIARY LOCAL 694), 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-11927 
STATE OP NEW YORK-UNIFIED COURT SYSTEM, 
Respondent. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (JEROME LEFKOWITZ 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
HOWARD E. RUBENSTEIN, ESQ. (NORMA MEACHAM and LEONARD 
KERSHAW of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(Capital Region Judiciary Local 694) (CSEA) to a decision by the 
Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director). The Assistant Director 
dismissed CSEA's charge against the State of New York-Unified 
Court System (UCS) which alleges that the UCS violated §2 09-
a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it 
rescinded its practice of permitting unit employees to attend 
CSEA's annual picnic without charge to their accrued leave time. 
The Assistant Director dismissed the charge on two different 
grounds. First, he held that CSEA had waived any further right 
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to bargain over picnic leave because it gave UCS the discretion 
to grant or deny paid leave for certain purposes, including a 
picnic, in the parties7 collective bargaining agreement. 
Alternatively, the Assistant Director held that CSEA's 
allegations were beyond our jurisdiction because the contractual 
leave provisions were a reasonably arguable source of right-7 to 
CSEA with respect to paid leave for picnic attendance. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that the contractual leave 
provisions are not a waiver of its right to a continuation of 
paid leave for picnics because they do not apply to picnics. 
CSEA also argues that the Assistant Director's dismissal for lack 
of jurisdiction is incorrect because the contract clause is not a 
source of right to it in relevant respect. UCS argues in its 
response that the Assistant Director's decision is correct and 
should be affirmed. 
Article 9 of the parties' 1988-91 contract, covering time 
and leave, lists several types of paid leave. Paid leave for 
attendance at picnics is not specifically mentioned. However, 
§9.5(j) of the contract provides that UCS' Deputy Chief 
Administrator for Management Support or his/her designee may 
^County of Nassau, 24 PERB [^3 029 (1991) , in which we held that 
the jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) of the Act is 
triggered if a contract is a reasonably arguable source of right 
to a charging party with respect to the subject matter of its 
charge. 
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grant leave with pay for purposes other than the several 
specified. -1 
The first ground for the Assistant Director's decision is a 
disposition of the charge on the merits, which necessarily 
assumes that we have the power to reach those merits. Logically, 
a jurisdictional determination must be made before any 
consideration is given to the merits of a charge because we 
cannot decide issues which the Legislature has not empowered us 
to decide.-7 Therefore, we first consider CSEA's exception to 
the Assistant Director's jurisdictional dismissal. 
We do not agree that the parties' contract is a reasonably 
arguable source of right to CSEA with respect to its allegation 
that unit employees are entitled to paid leave to attend the CSEA 
picnic. As the jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) of the Act 
is keyed, in relevant respect, to a violation of contract, it is 
not triggered unless a charging party can claim arguably that the 
actions subject to its improper practice charge violate its 
contract. Having vested UCS with unqualified discretion 
regarding the grant of paid leave for picnics, nothing in the 
parties' contract gives CSEA unit employees a right to paid leave 
for that purpose. As we view the clause, it is only a source of 
-/The contract lists the following types of paid leave: annual, 
sick, workers' compensation, subpoenaed appearance and jury 
attendance, civil service examination, quarantine, leaves 
required by law, civil defense duties, death in immediate family, 
directed absences and blood donations. 
^Erie County Water Auth. , 25 PERB }[3017 (1992) . 
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right to the UCS which forms a waiver defense to the charge. 
Therefore, the Assistant Director properly reached the merits of 
the charge. We, accordingly, reach consideration of the first 
ground for the Assistant Director's decision. Having thoroughly 
reviewed the exceptions and the parties' briefs, we find no 
factual or legal basis to set aside the Assistant Director's 
decision in this respect nor are there any issues raised on this 
appeal which were not fully and properly addressed by the 
Assistant Director. We, therefore, affirm the Assistant 
Director's dismissal of the charge for the reasons stated in his 
decision. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinr - "• "• -sella, Chairperson 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The 
ALJ, after hearing, dismissed CSEA's charge against the State of 
New York (Governor's Office of Employee Relations) (State) which 
alleges that the State violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it cancelled 
unilaterally a labor-management achievement awards luncheon 
scheduled for November 20, 1990. The ALJ dismissed the charge 
for lack of jurisdiction because he held that the parties' 
contract covers the subject matter of the charge. 
CSEA argues in its exceptions that we have jurisdiction over 
this charge because the achievement awards luncheons, and the 
Board - U-12056 \ -2 
privileges extended to award recipients,-' are noncontractual 
issues. The State argues in response that the awards luncheon is 
a project created and administered pursuant to Article 21 of the 
parties' contract, which establishes a Statewide Labor-Management 
Committee on productivity and quality of working life (CWEP). 
For the following reasons, we affirm the ALJ's dismissal of the 
charge for lack of jurisdiction. 
The jurisdictional limitation in §205.5(d) of the Act-7 is 
triggered if the parties' contract is a reasonably arguable 
source of right to a charging party with respect to the subject 
matter of its charge.-7 It is clear from the record that the 
award luncheons which were held in the past, and the one in 
issue, originally scheduled for November 20, 1990, were held only 
by agreement between the State and CSEA pursuant to Article 21 of 
their contract which establishes the CWEP, defines its mission 
and establishes its operating procedures.-7 It is equally clear 
-
7Award recipients were given release time to attend the 
luncheons and were reimbursed for travel expenses. 
-
7Section 205.5(d) of the Act provides, in relevant part: 
[T]he board shall, not have authority to 
enforce an agreement between an employer and 
an employee organization and shall not 
exercise jurisdiction over an alleged 
violation of such an agreement that would not 
otherwise constitute an improper employer or 
employee organization practice. 
^County of Nassau, -24 PEFJ3 [^3029 (1991). 
-
7The full text of Article 21 is set forth in the ALJ's decision 
and we do not restate it here because of its length. 
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that the privileges extended to award recipients were completely 
conditioned upon an awards luncheon being held. The source of 
CSEA's rights with respect to the awards luncheon is contractual 
and the State's announced decision to cancel the 1990 awards 
luncheon, which it had earlier agreed to hold, was either 
consistent with or in violation of Article 21 of the parties' 
contract. Therefore, the State's action merely arguably violated 
CSEA's contractual rights. In such circumstances, §205.5(d) of 
the Act necessitates a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.-'' 
That the awards luncheons conceivably could have been held 
without an agreement is immaterial. What is controlling is that 
the awards luncheons, in fact, were always established by 
agreement and administered under the parties' contract. 
For the reasons set forth above, CSEA's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
w'^ - K,v \ ^~ 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
U^M^L.t^ 
Walter. L. Eisenberg, Memb 
Eric/J. Schmertz, Member 
^State of New York (Division of State Police), 2 0 PERB fl3 03 8 
(1987) ; County of Nassau, 16 PERB [^3043 (1983) . 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
The Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (CSEA) and the County of Schenectady (County) have 
filed exceptions to a decision by the Assistant Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Assistant Director) holding 
that the County violated §209-a.l(a) and (d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to recognize and negotiate with 
the New York State Nurses Association (Association) as the bargaining 
agent for certain registered professional nurses (RNs), referred to 
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as community health nurses (CHNs), who were transferred from the City 
of Schenectady (City) to the County. 
CSEA and the County argue that our decision in State of New York 
(Department of Environmental Conservation) and Olympic Regional 
Development Authority (ORDA),- requires dismissal of the charge. 
The Association, however, supports the Assistant Director's reliance 
on our decision in City of Amsterdam-/ and buttresses its argument 
with several decisions involving accretion under the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA). 
The facts are not in dispute. Effective January 1, 1991, the 
nursing functions of the City of Schenectady's Health Department were 
transferred to the County.-/ From 1968 to that date, the RNs 
employed in the Community Health Unit of the City's Health Department 
1/20 PERB 53046 (1987) . 
2/17 PERB 1(3045 (1984), petition to review dismissed, 17 PERB 
57015 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 1984). 
-/No challenge to the transfer of function was made to us or, on 
this record, in any other forum. The County in its brief argues that 
the transfer of function was made in accordance with Civil Service 
Law §70. Stipulated documents in the record indicate that, by 
resolution dated September 4, 1990, the City elected to join the 
Schenectady County Health District and that the City Mayor issued her 
consent pursuant to Public Health Law §340, which provides, in 
relevant part: 
No city or any part thereof shall be included as a part of 
any such health district unless the mayor and a majority of 
the common council of such city or the officials exercising 
similar powers shall have consented thereto and, in respect 
of cities having a population of 50,000 or more, according 
to the last preceding federal or state census or 
enumeration, unless a majority of the supervisors 
representing that part of the county outside such city 
shall have consented thereto. 
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had been in a separate negotiating unit represented by the 
Association. The most recent collective bargaining agreement for 
that unit was effective January 1, 1990 to December 31, 1992. 
The approximately twelve RNs who transferred to the County on 
January 1, 1991 became employees of the County. The Association's 
January 4, 1991 request that the County "recognize this Association 
and bargain collectively with it as . . . representative" of these 
transferred employees was denied by the County on January 10, 
1991,-1 because "CSEA presently represents all Registered 
Professional Nurses employed by the County of Schenectady." 
By agreement between CSEA and the County, the transferred nurses 
were accreted to the "wall-to-wall" unit of approximately 940 County 
employees represented by CSEA. CSEA's unit includes RNs at the 
County Home and RNs and Licensed Practical Nurses at the County Jail. 
Licensed Practical Nurses employed by the County at the County Home 
are in a separate bargaining unit. CSEA and the County agreed that 
the terms of the CSEA/County 1990-93 collective bargaining agreement 
would apply to CHNs. In addition, because there was no provision for 
"stand-by pay" in that agreement, they negotiated that benefit for 
the CHNs, which was equivalent to a similar benefit provided in the 
collective bargaining agreement between the City and the Association. 
On or about March 19, 1991, the CHNs' office moved from City property 
to County office space. 
The CHNs perform on a County-wide basis essentially the same 
functions as they did when employed by the City. The parties 
^The letter is misdated "19 9 0". 
-4 
^ 
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stipulated, however, that, while the CHNs' services are now available 
to all County residents, most of their functions are still performed 
at locations within the City. As of the date the record was closed, 
there was no working relationship between the CHNs and other County 
nurses, although the CHNs do "occasionally interact" with employees 
in the County's Department of Social Services, as they did when 
employed by the City. 
On May 14, 1991, the County created the title of Director of 
Special Clinical Services,-'' which had not been filled by the date 
the record closed. The County expects the incumbent in that title to 
perform clinical services at both the County Jail and the Well Baby 
Clinics throughout the County. It is intended that the Director's 
job duties will include supervision of the nursing staff at the 
County Jail and that the Director will work in concert with the CHNs 
and may, at times, direct their duties when performing clinical 
duties at the Well Baby Clinics.-7 
Both the Association/City collective bargaining agreement and 
the one between the CSEA and County are extensive documents, covering 
a wide range of similar benefit areas, although the Association/City 
agreement more specifically addresses the working conditions of the 
CHNs. 
-''it appears that this position is not in a bargaining unit. 
-''The affidavit submitted by the County regarding this title 
also indicates that the County is planning to create a Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases Clinic in which the Director will have a similar 
role to that described above regarding the Well Baby Clinics. 
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This case involves accretion concepts and, more specifically, 
the statutory obligations of a successor employer to the 
representative of its predecessor's former employees. 
We have defined accretion as 
a procedure for clarifying a negotiating unit by 
specifying the inclusion within it of job titles 
that were implicitly within the unit when it was 
first defined. Thus, for example, a claim of 
accretion arises when an employer acquires an 
additional facility or when it creates new 
positions after the original unit was defined. 
The claim is that the original unit definition is 
sufficiently broad to encompass the employees 
working at the new facility or filling the new 
position. -1 
Although reference has been made to case law under the NLRA in 
analyzing accretion cases arising under the Act,-7 as we made clear 
in State of New York (Department of Environmental Conservation) and 
Olympic Regional Development Authority (at 3099): 
[T]he treatment of the "successor employer" 
problem under the Taylor Law . . . must be 
fashioned on the basis of the policies and 
provisions of that Law and other statutes 
relevant to the conduct of the affected public 
employers. 
In particular, the legal obligations of 
"successor" public employers must be consistent 
with our longstanding interpretation of the Act 
that the criteria set out in CSL §2 07.1 requires 
us to certify only the "most appropriate" units 
^Incorporated Village of Hempstead, 12 PERB fl3 051, at 3 095 
(1979). See also Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth., 3 PERB 
^4020, at 4270 (1970), which defines accretion as "increase by 
adhesion or inclusion." 
Estate of New York (Dep/t of Environmental Conservation) and 
ORDA, supra note 1; City of Amsterdam, supra note 2; Niagara Frontier 
Transportation Auth., supra note 7; Edwards-Russell Cent. School 
Dist., 19 PERB 54041 (1986). See also Power Auth. of the State of 
New York, 14 PERB ^4652, at 4804 n. 3 (1981). 
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and that these are ordinarily the largest units 
consistent with the Act's standards.-7 
In City of Amsterdam, a representation proceeding, two discrete 
units were transferred from two separate employers to a third 
employer within six months of each other. Approximately seven months 
later, after it had created a department combining the employees of 
both units, the successor employer filed a petition seeking to merge 
the two units into one. We noted that the successor employer in that 
case was "required to deal with the unions that represented the 
employees of its two predecessors in the preexisting negotiating 
units, unless those negotiating units can otherwise be found to be 
inappropriate".—'' We then applied the uniting standards of §2 07.1 
of the Act and determined that the "undisputed long history of 
effective representation in both negotiating units",—' albeit under 
their prior employers, evidenced separate communities of interest and 
outweighed the employer's claim of administrative convenience. The 
petition to merge the units was, therefore, dismissed. 
The Association misreads City of Amsterdam to the extent it 
argues that the County must continue to recognize and bargain with it 
for a separate unit of CHNs because the County took over the discrete 
City unit. Although in City of Amsterdam, as here, an entire 
discrete unit was transferred, the controlling feature of that case 
-''See also Cuba-Rushford Cent. School Dist. v. Rushford Faculty 
Ass'n. 24 PERB J[7538, at 7612 (Sup. Ct. Allegany Co. 1991) (school 
district annexation); Binqhamton-Johnson City Joint Sewage Bd., 24 
PERB «R4603, at 4759 (1991) (successor employee organization). 
—
/City of Amsterdam, supra note 2, at 3 072 n. 2. 
^Id. at 3 071. 
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was our conclusion on application of the uniting criteria in §207.1 
of the Act that a continuation of the discrete units was most 
appropriate. Analysis here of those same uniting criteria, however, 
leads us to a different conclusion. The County has not succeeded to 
two separate uniting structures independent, as in City of Amsterdam, 
of any other uniting in the County. It is against the County's 
existing unit structure that the most appropriate unit determination 
must be made. Under such circumstances, the long history of 
effective representation in the City and County units—7 and the fact 
that the CHNs continue to function separately from other County 
operations are outweighed by the substantial community of interest 
evidenced by the overall recognition clause in the CSEA/County unit, 
the existence of other registered nurses in CSEA's unit,—7 the 
relatively small number of CHNs as compared to the large number of 
employees in the County unit, and the similarity of benefits in the 
units' most recent collective bargaining agreements. 
Based on the above, we find no legal obligation by the County to 
recognize or negotiate with the Association concerning the CHNs. 
Therefore, CSEA's and the County's exceptions are granted and the 
decision of the Assistant Director is reversed. 
—
7There is no claim or evidence that the CSEA/County unit is of 
short duration, nor that the representation of either unit has been 
ineffective. 
—''Whether a separate unit of all County nurses would be 
appropriate is not before us here. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it hereby 
is, dismissed in its entirety. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Peter G. Saree has filed exceptions to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing his charge against the Transit Supervisors 
Organization (TSO), his former bargaining agent, and the Transit 
Supervisors Benevolent Association (TSBA), apparently his current 
bargaining agent. Saree alleges in his charge that both the TSO 
and the TSBA breached their duty of fair representation in 
violation of §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
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Act (Act).-; The Director notified Saree that his charge was 
legally and factually deficient as filed, remained deficient 
despite amendment, and, when Saree declined to withdraw the 
charge, the Director dismissed it. 
The charge has several enumerated allegations against the 
TSBA and one against the TSO. As against the TSBA, Saree first 
alleges that it refused his request for a copy of the 1988-91 
contract between it and the Authority. The Director dismissed 
this allegation on the ground that the TSBA had no statutory duty 
to give Saree a copy of the contract. Saree next alleges that 
the TSBA agreed in that contract to a clause which violates the 
federal wage and hour laws, permitted the Authority to charge his 
time-off from work against holidays instead of compensatory time 
accruals, permitted the Authority to institute a new sick leave 
policy, and failed to process his grievances in 1987, 1988 and 
1989. The Director dismissed all. of these allegations as 
untimely because they involved actions which were taken more than 
four months before the charge was filed.-1 Saree also alleges 
that the TSBA improperly refused to help him persuade the TSO to 
-''This section of the Act, added in 1990, codifies a union's duty 
of fair representation as previously recognized by us and the 
courts. Saree's employer, the Manhattan and Bronx Surface 
Transit Operating Authority (Authority) has been added as a party 
pursuant to §209-a.3 of the Act. 
^Section 204.1(a)(1) of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) 
establishes a four-month filing period for improper practice 
charges. 
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represent him regarding a job-related complaint dating back to 
198 2 when he was represented by the TSO.-7 The Director 
dismissed this allegation on the ground that the TSBA had no 
legal duty to assist Saree because he was then represented by the 
TSO, not the TSBA. 
Saree alleges as against the TSO that in 1991 it refused to 
represent him on that 1982 incident. The Director dismissed this 
allegation because there were no facts pleaded which would 
evidence that the TSO's refusal to represent Saree on the almost 
decade-old incident was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad 
faith. 4/ 
Saree excepts to each of the Director's dispositions. In 
response to the exceptions, the Authority argues that the 
Director's decision is correct and, moreover, that the charge 
should be dismissed because it is so vague and incomprehensible 
as to deprive it and the respondents of an ability to prepare a 
defense. 
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the Director's 
dismissal of the charge. 
^According to the allegations in Saree's charge, a pedestrian 
falsely alleged that Saree had assaulted him while on duty. The 
criminal charge, according to Saree, was dismissed after several 
court appearances. 
-'This is our standard for a union's breach of its duty of fair 
representation. See, e.g. , AFSCME Local 650, 24 PERB [^3040 
(1991). 
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Although Saree argues in his exceptions that §204-a of the 
Act entitles him to a copy of the contract, we need not reach 
that legal issue.-7 There are no allegations in the charge as 
filed or amended as to whether the TSBA and the Authority even 
had negotiated or executed a 1988-91 contract at the dates of 
Saree's requests for a copy and similarly there are no 
allegations as to whether the TSBA ever submitted any document 
for ratification. Section 204-a of the Act could have no 
application under such circumstances and, therefore, Saree's 
argument that the Director incorrectly dismissed this aspect of 
his charge is meritless. 
Saree's allegation that the TSBA breached its duty of fair 
representation by not helping him redress his complaints 
regarding the 1982 incident is deficient as a matter of law. The 
duty of fair representation is owed by the recognized or 
certified bargaining agent to the employees in its unit because 
the union is the exclusive representative for that unit.-7 The 
incident in 1982 happened when Saree was represented by the TSO. 
As the TSBA did not represent Saree in 1982, it was not under a 
legal obligation in 1991 to address his complaints arising from 
that incident even assuming, as alleged, that one of the TSBA-'s 
-'Section 204-a.2 of the Act provides, in relevant part, that 
every union "submitting . . . a written agreement to its members 
for ratification" shall publish the notice specified in §204-a.l 
of the Act. 
-
7Act §204.2. 
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agents years ago assured Saree that at some point he would be 
made whole by the Authority for the time he used and the money he 
spent in defense of the criminal complaint. To whatever extent 
Saree has any statutory cause of action in this respect, it lies 
against the TSO. 
In his exceptions to the Director's dismissal on timeliness 
grounds of the various allegations against the TSBA, Saree argues 
that it was not until recently that he discovered that he had not 
been credited with certain time and leave accruals or reimbursed 
for the legal expenses he incurred in conjunction with the 1982 
incident as allegedly promised him years ago by the TSBA and the 
TSO. As best we can understand Saree's charge, it appears that 
his allegations regarding lost time, pay and benefits relate 
directly or indirectly to this 1982 incident. Notwithstanding 
Saree's allegations that he was misled by certain statements made 
by certain TSBA and TSO agents, it appears fairly clear from the 
charge as amended that Saree had received information by at least 
January 1991 from which he concluded that he had been harmed. 
That is the last date, under any construction, from which his 
four-month filing period would begin to run on the particular 
allegations he filed. His charge as filed in August 1991 is, 
therefore, untimely in these respects. Although the TSBA's 
alleged refusal to process certain grievances in 1987, 1988 and 
1989 is unrelated to the 1982 incident, the allegations in that 
respect are untimely because Saree either knew or should have 
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known of the TSBA's refusal to process these grievances more than 
four months before he filed the charge. 
Saree's allegation that the TSBA years ago entered into a 
contract containing a clause which violates the federal wage and 
hour law warrants some additional comment. The violation alleged 
is limited to the entering into of that agreement, not to any 
application of it to him, and we have held that particular 
allegation to be time barred. Saree has not set forth the clause 
in issue, has not identified the provisions of federal law which 
were allegedly violated by the contract and he does not allege 
that the clause is currently in effect and is being applied to 
him illegally. Whether the clause is illegal under federal law 
and whether, if so, a charge contesting its present application 
to him would be similarly time barred are issues which are not 
raised by this charge. 
This leaves for consideration Saree's allegation against the 
TSO which the Director dismissed on the merits. In August 1991, 
the TSO told Saree that it would not represent him on a grievance 
related to the 1982 incident because too much time had elapsed 
and it lacked the necessary supporting records. Saree argues 
that we should hold the TSO's 1991 decision to be in breach of 
its fair representation duty because the TSO's agents told him in 
1983 and 1984 that it would file a grievance to have his legal 
expenses paid and that his leave accruals, which were charged for 
absences from work to attend court dates, would be credited. 
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In agreement with the Director, we hold that the TSO's 
decision not to file a grievance concerning the 1982 incident was 
not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. There is nothing 
in Saree's allegations to suggest that the TSO's agents in 1983 
or 19 84 never intended to carry through with their promise to 
address his complaints. From Saree's allegations, it appears 
that he was paid for certain court appearances and that he 
believed that his complaints had been otherwise satisfied. He 
then had no contact with the TSO regarding a grievance for 
several years from which it was not unreasonable for the TSO to 
conclude that the matter had been resolved. Accordingly, its 
refusal in August 1991 to resurrect the matter by grievance was 
not arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith, particularly given 
Saree's inaction. At most, both Saree and the TSO were negligent 
and negligence alone cannot establish a breach of duty.-7 By 
1991, the TSO was faced with a situation in which it could 
reasonably conclude that a grievance concerning a 1982 incident 
would not be successful. We cannot say, under these 
circumstances, that its judgment in that respect was arbitrary, 
discriminatory or in bad faith. 
z/Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 134 LRRM 2153 (1990); 
Smith v. Sipe, 67 N.Y.2d 928, 19 PERB [^7507 (1986). 
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For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the Director's 
decision and deny Saree's exceptions. IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
that the charge must be, and hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Correction 
Officers' Professional Society of Nassau County (COPS) to a 
decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director). By the petition it filed with the 
Director, COPS seeks to be certified as the negotiating agent for 
deputy sheriffs (deputies) and correction officers (co's) who are 
employed in the Sheriff's Department of the County of Nassau. 
These employees are currently represented by the Civil Service 
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Employees Association, Inc., Nassau Local 830, AFSCME, Local 
1000, AFL-CIO (CSEA) in a unit with most of the other employees 
of the County of Nassau (County). 
The Director rejected COPS' assertion that the Sheriff of 
Nassau County (Sheriff), who is an appointee of the County 
Executive, is a joint employer with the County of the Sheriff's 
Department employees as a matter of law and fact. Finding the 
County to be the sole employer of the deputies and co's, the 
Director held that the petition was within the jurisdiction of 
the Nassau County Public Employment Relations Board (Mini-PERB), 
which covers representation disputes involving County employees. 
Pursuant to that determination, the Director transferred COPS' 
petition to the Mini-PERB for processing in accordance with that 
agency's rules. 
The County and CSEA both support the Director's conclusion 
that the County is the sole employer of the deputies and co's. 
CSEA argues under its cross-exceptions, however, that the 
Director should have dismissed COPS' petition because the 
petition is not within our jurisdiction and its filing with us 
did not invoke the Mini-PERB's jurisdiction. ' 
COPS on appeal renews its argument that, as to the deputies 
and co's, there is a joint employer relationship between the 
County and the Sheriff and, therefore, the petition is within our 
jurisdiction and not the Mini-PERB's. The basis for COPS' 
argument is that the appointive Sheriff is a "public employer" 
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within the meaning of §201.6(a)(vi) of the Public Employees7 Fair 
Employment Act (Act).-1 The assertion underlying the entirety 
of COPS' argument is that if there are two or more public 
employers as defined in §201.6(a) of the Act as to any particular 
group of employees, then each of those public employers must be 
made a part of a joint employer relationship. Analysis of COPS' 
argument must be made within the context of our joint employer 
cases, both as they involve county sheriffs in particular and 
others in general. 
In affirming the Board's decision in County of Ulster and 
the Ulster County Sheriff's Office (hereafter Ulster),-; the 
Appellate Division, Third Department held that the sheriff was a 
public employer as an instrumentality of government who exercised 
governmental powers.-f As the statutory powers and duties of a 
sheriff's office upon which the public employer finding was 
premised in Ulster do not appear to vary in material respect 
whether the incumbent is elected or appointed, COPS argues that 
an appointive sheriff also falls within the statutory definition 
of a public employer. 
-/Section 201.6(a) (vi) of the Act provides that the term 
"government" or "public employer" means: "any other public 
corporation, agency or instrumentality or unit of government 
which exercises governmental powers under the laws of the state." 
&3 PERB ^3032 (1970) . 
^37 A.D.2d 437, 4 PERB [^7015 (1971). 
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That the Sheriff here may be a public employer as defined 
does not, however, end our inquiry. The question still remains 
whether that public employer must be made a part of a joint 
employer relationship with the County. In that respect, nothing 
in Ulster, in which a majority of the Board first held there to 
be a joint employer relationship between a county and an elected 
sheriff, or our other decisions, supports the proposition 
advanced by COPS that all defined public employers must be 
established as a joint employer of any particular group of 
employees. We have held that the several statutory definitions 
of a public employer merely specify those persons or entities 
which are generally subject to the Act and that the existence of 
a joint employer relationship has no necessary implications for 
structuring the most appropriate negotiating unit.-7 Similarly, 
that a particular individual or entity literally meets the 
definition of a public employer has no necessary implications for 
a finding that there exists a joint employer relationship as a 
matter of law. Indeed, the contention advanced by COPS is 
essentially the same as the one advocated by then Board Member 
Denson in his dissent in Town of Ramapo,-7 which was rejected by 
the majority of the Board. 
By focusing its arguments on the common law and statutory 
powers and duties of a sheriff's office, COPS ignores the basic 
^Town of North Castle, 19 PERB [^3025 (1986) . 
^8 PERB 1[3057 (1975) . 
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reason for finding a joint employer relationship. Section 
201.6(b) of the Act cautions that a joint employer determination 
should be made only when it "would best effectuate the purposes 
of [the Act]." Beginning with Ulster, in which the Appellate 
Division noted the "practical necessity"-7 for the joint 
employer determination it upheld in that case, we have found a 
joint employer relationship only when the control over the 
employment relationship is divided between two public employers 
to the point where there cannot be meaningful negotiations 
without a joint employer designation.-7 As joint employer 
status has been conceded in most cases involving sheriffs' 
department employees,-7 there has been little subsequent 
discussion of the basis for the joint employer determination in 
Ulster. A proper understanding of that decision necessitates an 
appreciation of the uniqueness of the sheriff's office from an 
historical perspective. 
A sheriff was liable for the negligence or misconduct of his 
deputies, any of whose duties related to civil matters,-7 even 
when those civil duties were arguably slight and incidental to 
^
737 A.D.2d at 439, 4 PERB at 7100. 
-
7See, e.g.
 f Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth. , 13 PERB 1(3003 
(1980). 
-
;See, e.g., County of Orange, 14 PERB f3012 (1981) ; County of 
Albany. 15 PERB }[3 008 (1982) ; and County of Clinton, 18 PERB 
^3070 (1985). 
-
7Grifenhagen v. Ordway, 218 N.Y. 451 (1916), reaffirming 
Flaherty v. Milliken, 193 N.Y. 564 (1908). 
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criminal duties.—7 Because of this liability, a sheriff was 
generally permitted to hire and fire deputies, without benefit or 
restriction of any civil service requirements.-1 The sheriff's 
control over certain aspects of the deputies7 employment 
relationship stemmed from this centuries-old imposition of 
vicarious liability. Construing Ulster not long after it was 
issued, the Board stated that a joint employer relationship was 
found in that case because "the Sheriff was responsible for 
appointing his deputies, who served at his pleasure, while the 
County controlled appropriations covering benefits sought by the 
deputy sheriffs."—'' 
It is our opinion that this uniqueness of a sheriff's 
office, which is the primary underpinning for a joint employer 
relationship between a county and sheriff, has been removed by a 
^O'Brien v. Ordwav, 218 N.Y. 509 (1916). Appointees of the 
sheriff whose duties related exclusively to criminal matters were 
considered to be in the service of the general public and were 
always subject to civil service regulations. 
—'it has been recognized, however, that in certain circumstances 
a county, by local law, may place a sheriff's civil deputies 
within the classified civil service system. See McMahon v. 
Michaelian, 30 N.Y.2d 507 (1972), aff'g 38 A.D.2d 60 (2d Dep't 
1971). 
^New York Public Library, 5 PERB ^3045, at 3079 n. 7 (1972) 
(subsequent history omitted). 
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recent change in the State Constitution, at least insofar as an 
appointive sheriff is concerned.—7 
Effective January 1, 1990, New York Constitution, 
Article XIII, §13(a) was amended to delete the provision 
exempting a county from responsibility for the acts of a sheriff. 
As construed in Thoubboron v. New York State Department of Civil 
Service—' (hereafter Thoubboron), the purpose of this 
constitutional amendment was to relieve sheriffs throughout the 
State of personal liability for their acts or omissions and for 
the acts and omissions of their appointees in discharging 
official duties relating to civil process. In Thoubboron, the 
Court of Appeals held that the constitutional amendment overruled 
Flaherty v. Milliken,—' thereby bringing even those appointees 
of sheriffs performing civil functions fully into the classified 
civil service system. 
After Thoubboron, an appointive sheriff, for purposes of the 
Act, is no differently situated as a matter of law than the many 
different officials of state and local government who carry out 
statutory mandates of various types, none of whom have been 
—'We do not here decide the joint employer status of an elected 
sheriff. There may be other considerations involving an elected 
sheriff, not presented in this case, which may warrant continued 
recognition of a joint employer relationship between a county and 
an elected sheriff. 
^ N.Y.2d (April 30, 1992), aff 'a 175 A.D.2d 443 (3d Dep't 
1991). 
—
7Supra note 10. 
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identified as independent public employers or have been made part 
of a joint employer relationship.—7 Moreover, there is no 
basis for finding a joint employer relationship on the particular 
facts of this case because the record shows that effective 
control over the employment relationship of deputies and co's 
resides solely with the County. 
The consequences of a contrary conclusion further persuade 
us that a finding of a joint employer relationship in this case 
would not, as required, effectuate the policies of the Act. 
First, establishing a joint employer relationship whenever an 
agency head or other identified position within a defined 
government had duties imposed upon them by law would make that 
relationship the norm for many employees, not the rarity we first 
contemplated in Ulster and have adhered to since that decision. 
Second, establishment of potentially hundreds of joint employer 
relationships would negatively affect existing bargaining 
relationships and complicate the application of long-established 
principles governing the formation of the most appropriate 
bargaining unit. Finally, a conclusion other than the one we 
reach would make it largely impossible for a government to 
-'See, e.g., Hudson Valley Dist. Council of Carpenters v. State 
of New York, 152 A.D.2d 15, 23 PERB K7514 (3d Dep't 1989) (State 
Commissioner of Correctional Services not a public employer); 
County of Erie Bd. of Elections, 19 PERB f3069 (1986) (County, 
not Board of Elections or commissioners thereof, held employer); 
Town of Ramapo, supra note 5 (elected Town Highway Superintendent 
not employer); County of Ontario. 15 PERB ^4089 (1982) (County 
Election Board not employer). 
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establish its own local agency for the disposition of 
representation disputes and bargaining impasses simply because of 
the sheer number of potential different governments which would 
be created under the proposition advanced by COPS. 
Having concluded that the County is the sole employer of 
the employees in issue, we have no jurisdiction over the 
petition. As such, we are without power to order the petition 
transferred to the Mini-PERB. CSEA's cross-exception, objecting 
to the Director's transfer order, is, therefore, granted. 
For the reasons set forth above, COPS' exceptions are denied 
and the Director's decision is affirmed except insofar as he 
ordered the petition transferred to the Mini-PERB for processing. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the petition be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
K>n^lt. 
Pauline R. Kinsejla, Chairperson 
IbwfcJ?. 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
INC., LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
GREENE COUNTY LOCAL 82 0, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12 442 
COUNTY OF GREENE and GREENE COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Respondents. 
NANCY E. HOFFMAN, GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN CRAIN 
of counsel), for Charging Party 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH, P.C. (ELAYNE G. GOLD of 
counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions to an Administrative Law 
Judge's (ALJ) decision filed by the County of Greene (County) and 
the Greene County Sheriff (Sheriff)• On a stipulated record, the 
ALJ held that the County1' violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
instituted a hearing procedure to determine an injured employee's 
eligibility for the salary and benefits provided to him under 
General Municipal Law (GML) §2 07-c. GML §2 07-c entitles a police 
officer who is injured or who becomes ill in the line of duty the 
-
/rThe ALJ dismissed the charge as against the Sheriff because the 
stipulated record addressed only the County's actions. No 
exceptions have been taken to the ALJ's dismissal of the charge 
in this respect. 
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full amount of his or her salary or wages, medical and hospital 
expenses, subject to the conditions set forth in that statute. 
The County argues in its exceptions that its benefits 
eligibility hearing is not mandatorily negotiable. CSEA argues 
in response that the ALJ's holding is correct and must be 
affirmed. 
Several years after an employee's injury, for which he was 
placed on GML §2 07-c status, the County decided that his injury 
may not have been duty related. The employee, Robert Fisher, was 
notified in December 1990 that a hearing would be held to 
determine his eligibility for GML §207-c benefits, although no 
such procedure had previously existed or been used. The County 
held the hearing despite CSEA's objection that the hearing 
process was mandatorily negotiable.-1 
We decided closely related issues most recently in City of 
Schenectady.-' We there held that GML §207-c benefits are terms 
and conditions of employment as a form of wages and that the 
procedures which condition, restrict or potentially deny an 
employee's receipt of those wages and benefits are generally 
mandatorily negotiable. 
Although judicial interpretations of GML §2 07-c require an 
employer to hold a "due process" hearing before terminating an 
-'The hearing was apparently held before a hearing officer and 
resulted in the employee being denied GML §207-c benefits on a 
finding that his injury was not duty related. 
^25 PERB H3022 (April 30, 1992). 
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employee's §2 07-c benefits,^ neither GML §2 07-c itself nor the 
judicial interpretations of it specify the type of hearing that 
must be held. Indeed, GML §2 07-c by its terms is completely 
silent in this respect and the relevant case law establishes only 
the minimum constitutional due process protections which must be 
afforded an employee, such as notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. \ 
The County's observance of those constitutional due process 
minimums, however, does not exempt it from a duty to comply with 
its separate obligation under the Act to bargain the terms and 
conditions of employment of its organized employees.-7 In this 
case, for example, CSEA may have preferred to have had the 
required hearing before an arbitrator who was selected mutually 
by the parties. The County's unilateral establishment and 
implementation of the hearing process in this case denied CSEA 
its statutory right to bargain the system by which its unit 
employees' wages and benefits will be determined. 
Although in City of Schenectady-7 we concluded that the 
employer's unilateral imposition of a light duty and surgical 
requirement under GML §207-c did not violate the Act, we did so 
only on a finding that the Legislature intended to exempt an 
-'See, e.g., Hodella v. Town of Greenburqh, 73 A.D.2d 967 (2d 
Dep't 1980), motion for leave to appeal denied, 49 N.Y.2d 708 
(1980). 
-
7See, e.g., Board of Educ. of the City School Dist. of the City 
of New York v. PERB. 75 N.Y.2d 660, 23 PERB 517012 (1990). 
-
/Sup_ra note 2. 
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employer from a duty to bargain those two particular 
requirements. Our conclusion was based upon the legislative 
scheme which we found evidenced in those two respects by the 
specification of mutual rights and obligations provided in GML 
§2 07-c and case law interpretations of that statute. We did not 
find any legislative scheme, however, with respect to several 
other GML §2 07-c procedures which had been promulgated 
unilaterally. As with those procedures which we held to be 
mandatorily negotiable in City of Schenectady, we find nothing in 
GML §2 07-c as written or interpreted to suggest that the 
Legislature intended to exempt an employer from a duty to bargain 
the hearing procedures by which an employee's eligibility for GML 
§2 07-c wages and benefits is determined. 
For the reasons set forth above, the exceptions are denied 
and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the County: 
1. Rescind and cease implementa'tion of the hearing 
procedure used to determine Robert Fisher's eligibility 
for benefits under GML §2 07-c. 
2. Restore to Robert Fisher any salary or benefits lost as 
a result of the at-issue hearing procedure, with 
interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal 
rate. 
3. Remove immediately and destroy any documents compiled 
pursuant to the at-issue hearing procedure which are 
Board - U-12442 -5 
kept by the County or its agents for any personnel or 
employment-related purpose. 
4. Sign and post notice in the form attached at all 
locations where the County or its agents ordinarily 
post informational notices to employees in CSEA's unit. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify the employees in the unit represented by the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Greene County Local 820, that the County: 
1. Will rescind and cease implementation of the hearing 
procedure used to determine Robert Fisher's eligibility 
for benefits under General Municipal Law (GML) §2 07-c. 
2. Will restore to Robert Fisher any salary or benefits 
lost as a result of the GML §2 07-c eligibility hearing, 
with interest at the currently prevailing maximum legal 
rate. 
3. Will remove immediately and destroy any documents 
compiled pursuant to Robert Fisher's GML §2 07-c 
eligibility hearing which are kept by the County or its 
agents for any personnel or employment-related purpose. 
COUNTY OF GREENE 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
UNIFORM FIREFIGHTERS OF COHOES, 
LOCAL 2 526, IAFF, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and-
CITY OF COHOES, 
Respondent. 
6RASS0 AND GRASSO (KATHLEEN DeCATALDO of counsel), 
for Charging Party 
WERTIME, ROBINSON, RIES & VAN ULLEN, P.C. (STEPHEN J. 
VAN ULLEN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by the City of 
Cohoes (City) to a decision by an Administrative Law Judge (AKJ) 
on two related charges filed against the City by the Uniform 
Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2526, IAFF, AFL-CIO (Union). The 
Union alleges in its first charge that the City violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) 
when it ordered unit employees to submit to tuberculosis testing 
under procedures determined unilaterally by the City and refused 
to negotiate the impact of that order. The Union alleges in its 
second charge that the City again violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act 
when it failed to negotiate the procedures regarding the unit 
CASE NOS. U-12114 
and U-12436 
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employees who were required to submit to follow-up tuberculosis 
testing. 
After hearing, the ALT held that the City violated 
§209-a.l(d) by imposing unilaterally the procedures for the 
tuberculosis testing-7 and by threatening the unit employees 
with discipline for noncompliance with the orders to submit to 
testing. The charges were dismissed in all other respects. 
The City argues in its exceptions that the ALT erred as a 
matter of law in finding any violation of the Act because its 
refusal to negotiate the tuberculosis testing procedures was not 
"deliberate" as required by §209-a.l(d). Rather, the City 
contends that its orders to unit employees to undergo testing 
were, at most, a product of a misunderstanding of the County 
Health Department's requirements. The City also claims that the 
ALT erred factually in finding that it chose the method for the 
tuberculosis testing and threatened employees with discipline for 
noncompliance with the orders to submit to that testing. The 
City ends its exceptions with an argument that the ALT's decision 
violates public policy and that the make-whole remedial order is 
inappropriate as applied to off-duty employees who were required 
to undergo the testing. 
-'The Union conceded before the ALT the power of the County 
Health Department to order the testing and the City's duty to 
comply with that order. The ALT dismissed the charges to 
whatever extent the Union may have challenged the testing 
requirement itself and no exceptions have been filed to this 
aspect of the ALT's decision. 
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The Union in.its response to the City's exceptions argues 
that the ALJ's conclusions of law are correct and that the 
findings of fact are consistent with the record and, therefore, 
that the decision should be affirmed. 
In support of its argument that the charges should have been 
dismissed in their entirety because its refusal to bargain was 
not deliberate as required by §209-a.l of the Act,2/ the City 
alleges that in ordering the tuberculosis testing, it was only 
doing what it believed had been required of it by the County 
Department of Health. The City's argument in this respect fails 
for two reasons. 
First, if the action in issue is knowingly undertaken, it 
constitutes a deliberate action within the meaning of §209-a.l of 
the Act.-7 An employer may commit an improper practice without 
a specific intent to do so if the actions it takes are 
necessarily inconsistent with its statutory obligations and the 
statutory rights of its employees.-7 In this case, the City's 
unilateral establishment of the testing procedures bypassed the 
bargaining process, whether or not it intended to disavow its 
bargaining obligation. 
-
7The defined employer improper practices in §209-a.l are all 
preceded by the following introductory language: "It shall be an 
improper practice for a public employer or its agents 
deliberately . . . ." (emphasis added). 
?/See State of New York (Diaz). 18 PERB ^3047 (1985), rev'd sub 
nom. Civil Service Employees Ass'n v. PERB, 132 A.D.2d 430, 
20 PERB ?[7024 (3d Dep't 1987) , aff'd on other grounds, 
73 N.Y.2d 796, 21 PERB ^7017 (1988); Cohoes City School Dist., 
12 PERB 53065 (1979). 
ySee State of New York, 10 PERB ^3108 (1977). 
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Second, the record shows that the City's Mayor knew from 
conversations with an official from the County Health Department 
that the tuberculosis testing required by the Health Department 
could be done in a number of different ways. Notwithstanding 
this information, unit employees were instructed by the City to 
report to their departments for testing at a particular day and 
hour. Therefore, it is clear on the facts presented that the 
City deliberately chose one particular time and method of 
tuberculosis testing over others which were equally acceptable to 
the County Health Department. 
We also agree with the ALJ's finding that the unit employees 
reasonably understood that they would be subject to discipline if 
they refused to submit to the testing as ordered by the City. 
The paramilitary nature of the fire fighters' employment and the 
means by which they were ordered to submit to the testing-'' 
persuade us that they could not reasonably have reached any other 
conclusion about a refusal to comply with the order. We add, 
however, that notwithstanding the City's argument to the 
contrary, we would reach the same conclusion about the 
negotiability of the testing procedures and the City's failure to 
meet its bargaining duty with respect thereto, even if there were 
no disciplinary component to the testing requirement. As the ALJ 
-'Departmental correspondence, issued by the City's Mayor to all 
department heads, was posted on the fire department's bulletin 
board, notice was added to the employees' pay envelopes, and at 
least one employee was informed by the Fire Chief's office of his 
obligation to submit to testing. 
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noted in her decision, the City's unilateral choice of testing 
procedures implicated many of the employees' terms and conditions 
of employment apart from the grounds for the imposition of 
discipline. 
Our comments regarding the City's particularized exceptions 
are equally dispositive of its public policy arguments. There is 
no prescribed procedure for the tuberculosis testing required by 
the County Health Department. Bargaining about the choice of 
testing procedures and the timing of that testing would not have 
exempted the employees from an obligation to be tested nor would 
the bargaining otherwise have interfered with the City's effort 
to cooperate with the County Health Department in the 
accomplishment of a public health goal. 
The City last argues that the ALJ's remedial order is 
inappropriate to the extent that it requires the City to pay any 
unit employees who were required to report for the testing when 
they were off-duty. The basis for the City's argument in this 
respect is that the time the off-duty employees spent in the 
testing was not in furtherance of the City's business. This 
claim is irrelevant, however, even if true. Regardless of its 
reasons, the City, as employer and through its control of the 
employment relationship, ordered employees to report for testing 
at a particular date and time. It is most appropriate that the 
City compensate those employees who were compelled to give up 
their personal time to comply with the City's order for what 
became, in effect, work time. Ordering pay for that time, 
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therefore, does not represent any windfall to the affected unit 
employees. We have, however, deleted the cease and desist order 
from the ALJ's remedy because the testing has been implemented 
and the circumstances under which it was ordered appear to us to 
have been unique. There being no objection raised to the 
requirement to be tested, the make-whole order adequately 
remedies the City's refusal to bargain the testing procedures. 
For the reasons set forth above, the City's exceptions are 
denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed except as we have 
modified the remedy. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the City: 
1. Pay, at their then prevailing rate, those unit 
employees who, pursuant to City orders posted in 
October, 199 0, and January and February, 1991, reported 
for tuberculosis testing and/or follow-up testing on 
off-duty hours for which they have not already been 
compensated, plus the maximum legal rate of interest. 
2. Restore any time and/or wages lost to any unit 
employees who were disciplined for failing to follow 
the procedure imposed by the City for tuberculosis 
testing. 
3. Expunge any and all records of disciplinary action 
taken against any unit employee for failing to follow 
the procedure imposed by the City for tuberculosis 
testing. 
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Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
ordinarily used to post notices of information to unit 
employees. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Pauline R. Chairperson 
^ : 
Walter L .E i senberg , 




THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees in the unit represented by the Uniform 
Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2 526, IAFF, AFL-CIO that the City 
of Cohoes (City) will: 
1. Pay, at their then prevailing rate, those unit 
employees who, pursuant to City orders posted in October, 1990, 
and January and February, 1991, reported for tuberculosis testing 
and/or follow-up testing on off-duty hours, for which they have 
not already been compensated, plus the maximum legal rate of 
interest. 
2. Restore time and/or wages lost to any unit employees 
who were disciplined for failing to follow the procedure imposed 
by the City for tuberculosis testing. 
3. Expunge any and all records of disciplinary action 
taken against any unit employee for failing to follow the 
procedure imposed by the City for tuberculosis testing. 
City of Cohoes 
Dated. By. (Representative) (Titie) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting; and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ONONDAGA-CORTLAND-MADISON BOCES 
FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, NYSUT, 
AFT #2897, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-12308 
ONONDAGA-CORTLAND-MADISON BOCES, 
Respondent. 
HELEN W. BEALE, for Charging Party 
REBECCA STREIB, for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions of the Onondaga-
Cortland-Madison BOCES Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, AFT #2897 
(Federation) and cross-exceptions of the Onondaga-Cortland-
Madison Board of Cooperative Educational Services (BOCES) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The Federation's 
charge centers upon BOCES' actions with respect to approximately 
eighty employees employed in the titles of adult education 
teacher, teacher assistant and other related professional titles 
which we added to the Federation's existing unit in April 
1990.1; 
I723 PERB 53014 (1990). The Federation was certified by us as 
the representative for this unit on June 21, 1990. 23 PERB 
H3000.21 (1990). 
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In relevant part, the ALJ dismissed the Federation's 
allegations that BOCES violated §209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) by refusing to deduct 
agency fee payments from the employees who were added to the unit 
in 1990, by making repeated objections to the presence and 
participation of one of the members of the Federation's 
negotiating team and by making onerous bargaining demands. The 
Federation's exceptions are directed to these aspects of the 
ALJ's decision. The ALJ held, however, that BOCES violated §209-
a.l(a) and (c) of the Act when, on and after November 1, 1990, it 
withheld a wage increase from the newly accreted unit 
employees-7 and that it violated §209-a.l(d) by proposing during 
negotiations that the accreted employees be excluded from the 
unit. BOCES' exceptions are directed to these latter two 
aspects of the ALJ's decision and we turn to these first. 
BOCES' exceptions to the ALJ's decision on the 
discontinuation of the wage increases are to both his conclusions 
of law and his findings of fact. 
The first aspect of BOCES' exceptions necessitates a 
consideration of BOCES' obligation to maintain its compensation 
system after the Federation was certified. Under that system, 
the employees in issue had received annual wage increases 
-'The ALJ dismissed an allegation that the BOCES' action in this 
respect violated §209-a.l(d) of the Act. As no exceptions have 
been filed to the ALJ's dismissal of that allegation, we have no 
occasion to consider that part of the ALJ's decision. 
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pursuant to a performance review. BOCES argues that it was 
allowed, indeed required, to abandon its compensation system to 
permit a new wage system to be established for the accreted 
employees through collective negotiations. In this, BOCES 
misconstrues its duties under the Act. Any negotiations required 
over the at-issue employees7 wages and other terms and conditions 
of employment begin with and proceed from their existing wage and 
benefit base. An employer's obligation to maintain this status 
quo starts on the date it is presented with a bona fide 
representation question and continues to the date a wage and 
benefit package is fixed by collective negotiations with the 
recognized or certified bargaining agent. BOCES concedes the 
existence of this status quo obligation during the processing of 
the Federation's representation petition.-7 With this 
concession, BOCES' argument that the obligation disappears on 
recognition or certification of a bargaining agent is 
insupportable. The employees' right to choose whether to be 
represented by a union without interference or discrimination 
becomes meaningless if, as BOCES argues, their existing wages and 
benefits were permitted or required to be discontinued once they 
elected to be represented by a union. 
Contrary to BOCES' argument, this status quo obligation, 
which is necessary to preserve the employees' fundamental right 
to choose union representation, does not eviscerate the parties' 
-'See Hudson Valley Community College, 18 PERB ?[3057 (1985) . 
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duty to bargain or the statutory policies underlying that 
bargaining. To say that negotiations generally start from an 
established base does not mean that they necessarily end there. 
Those wages and other terms and conditions of employment which 
must be negotiated on demand may be improved, diminished or left 
unchanged. BOCES, for example, may propose that pay increases 
should be something less than the customary annual amount or that 
the merit-based system of compensation should be ended 
completely. 
BOCES' argument that it was in a "no win" situation because 
the Federation would have brought an improper practice charge 
against it even if it had continued the existing compensation 
plan is without merit. If BOCES had continued its wage policy 
after the Federation's certification, any charge objecting to the 
continuation of that policy would have been dismissed because 
BOCES would have honored its statutory obligation by maintaining 
the status quo. 
BOCES also argues that the record does not support the ALJ<s 
finding that those employees who were rated satisfactory would 
have received a $1.00 per hour wage increase. Rather, BOCES 
argues that its wage policy for unrepresented employees had been 
discretionary, such that the employees might have received no 
increase at all or an increase in an amount less than $1.00. 
The ALJ's finding that the wage increases had "routinely 
been one dollar per hour" rested on the unrebutted testimony of 
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Kathleen Stanton, who was one of the employees who had been added 
to the unit in 19 9 0.-7 Having reviewed the record, we, too, 
find that the employees in question received under BOCES' 
existing wage policy increases pursuant to a performance review 
and that those increases were, in the past, always in the amount 
of $1.00 per hour. BOCES' wage policy, adopted in September 1985 
and revised in June 1987 in undefined respects, states that pay 
increases "will be based on program budget, years of service and 
job performance . . . ." On this record, however, it appears 
that for approximately five years and without regard to 
circumstance, employees have received $1.00 per hour wage 
increases if rated satisfactory. There is no claim or evidence 
to suggest that BOCES would not again have granted a $1.00 
increase had it not been for the bargaining order which derived 
from the employees' decision to unionize. To the contrary, BOCES 
stipulated that it did not "issue the hourly increases because 
negotiations had begun as of November 1st . . . . " . In light of 
this record evidence, we have no basis to separate the amount of 
the wage increases from the salary review which led to them. We, 
therefore, conclude, as did the ALJ, that the at-issue employees 
would have received a $1.00 per hour wage increase had they not 
organized and that BOCES' refusal to grant that $1.00 per hour 
increase violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) of the Act. 
-'Stanton left her employment with the BOCES in June 1990 to take 
a position with a different employer. 
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BOCES argues under its second exception that the ALT erred 
as a matter of law in finding that it violated its bargaining 
obligation by seeking during negotiations to change the scope of 
the certified unit. A proposal to change the scope of a 
bargaining unit is a nonmandatory subject of negotiation.-7 We 
have held, however, that a party does not violate its bargaining 
obligation until it presses a nonmandatory subject to the point 
of insistence.-7 At the time the Federation's charge was filed, 
the parties were not at impasse. While recognizing our decisions 
in this respect, the ALJ concluded that BOCES' proposal violated 
its bargaining obligation because its demand to alter the unit 
rendered PERB's earlier certification proceedings meaningless. 
The ALJ carved out an exception to our cases on the improper 
insistence on nonmandatory subjects of negotiation for those 
demands relating to the composition of a bargaining unit. 
Although we fully recognize that negotiations about terms and 
conditions of employment may be made more difficult by permitting 
a party to raise a demand to change the unit definition, whatever 
temporary disruption in the bargaining process is caused by that 
type of demand is not greater than that caused by allowing 
negotiations for a time about many other nonmandatory subjects. 
We are not persuaded that our policy of encouraging the 
negotiation of nonmandatory subjects to the point of insistence 
-''City of Binqhamton, 10 PERB ^3092 (1977) . 
^Monroe-Woodbury Teachers Ass'n, 10 PERB ^3029 (1977) . 
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is ill-advised. Moreover, we cannot discern any basis upon which 
to differentiate among the many circumstances in which a 
negotiating unit may have been established-7 or the many types 
of nonmandatory subjects as the ALJ's analysis would require. 
Therefore, consistent with our earlier decisions on this issue, 
the ALJ's decision in this respect must be reversed. 
We turn now to a consideration of the Federation's 
exceptions. 
The AKJ dismissed that part of the charge relating to BOCES' 
refusal to deduct and transmit agency shop fee payments from the 
nonmember employees who were added to the unit in 1990 because he 
concluded that the authorization to negotiate an agency shop fee 
in §208.3(b) of the Act did not create any rights protected by 
the improper practice provisions of the Act. Rather, he held 
that §208.3(b) merely made mandatorily negotiable what was once a 
prohibited subject of negotiation because of its inherent 
interference with §202 rights.-7 We disagree and reverse in 
this respect. 
The agency shop fee provisions in the Act are more than just 
an authorization for involuntary monetary deductions from the 
salary or wages of the nonmembers of a union which would 
-
7It is not clear to us, for example, whether the ALJ would have 
reached the same conclusion if the unit had been fashioned by 
agreement between the parties or if the certification had issued 
without a hearing. 
g/Farriaan v. Helsbv, 42 A.D.2d 265, 6 PERB [^7009 (3d Dep't 
1973). 
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otherwise violate the Act. The agency shop fee provisions in 
§2 08.3 of the Act are part of a statutory system of union 
security arrangements which the Legislature considered were 
necessary and appropriate to the financial strength of the 
bargaining agent. Employees have the statutory right to 
representation by a bargaining agent of their choice. A union's 
ability to effectively represent its unit employees is 
unquestionably compromised by an employer's withholding of monies 
which the Act currently requires be deducted and transmitted, in 
this case, on negotiation of an agency shop fee provision.-7 
Any adverse effect upon the union caused by the withholding of 
fees the Act required be deducted necessarily affects the 
representation the union is able to give the unit and, thereby, 
improperly interferes with the right of all unit employees to be 
represented by that union. 
Our conclusion that an employer violates §209-a.l(a) of the 
Act by refusing to deduct agency shop fee monies in accordance 
with its agreement is also consistent with the legislative scheme 
underlying the deduction of agency fee monies. The improper 
practice provisions of the Act may be and have been invoked 
regularly by individuals who object to the deduction of agency 
fees from their salary or wages. Having required the deduction 
-'Employees in State negotiating units are subject to a mandatory 
agency shop fee deduction. Act §208.3(a). Legislation is 
currently pending, however, which would make the agency shop fee 
deduction mandatory for employees of local governments. 
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and transmittal of agency fees once negotiated, the Legislature 
could not reasonably have intended that the enforcement mechanism 
available to objecting individuals would be denied to the unions 
objecting to an employer's allegedly improper withholding of such 
monies. 
It remains to be decided, however, whether the at-issue 
employees are, in fact, covered by the agency shop fee provision 
in the parties' contract. BOCES argues that they are not because 
they were added to the unit after the agency shop clause was 
negotiated in 1989. We find no merit in this argument as a 
matter of law or fact. Nothing in the Act necessarily renders 
all existing contract terms inapplicable as a matter of law to 
all employees who become members of a bargaining unit after the 
date the contract is negotiated and BOCES offers no facts in 
support of its claim that the parties intended when the contract 
was negotiated to exclude future unit employees from the effects 
of the agency shop clause. The agency shop clause in the 
parties' contract applies to "each bargaining unit employee who 
is not a member of the Federation. . . . " The clause as written 
permits by its terms no exceptions. Rather, it is a 
benefit/obligation dependent simply upon a person's dual status, 
i.e., nonunion member/unit employee. 
Our interpretation of the parties' contract is further 
consistent with the purposes served by an agency shop fee 
deduction. The payments exacted from the nonmember unit 
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employees are for services required to be rendered by the 
bargaining agent on their behalf. That duty of representation 
becomes a union obligation when the nonmember employee is 
included in the negotiating unit and continues for so long as the 
person remains a member of the unit. It would be unreasonable to 
conclude from the language of the parties' contract that they 
intended the Federation would be burdened by the service 
obligation to nonmember employees but not benefitted by their 
payment obligation. Had the. parties intended this result, they 
could have easily drafted the clause to apply only to those 
employees who were employed at the date the contract was 
executed. Given the language of the contract, the general 
purposes of an agency shop fee provision, and the absence of 
affirmative evidence of a contrary intent, we find that the 
parties' agency shop fee clause is applicable to all unit 
employees, including those who were added to the unit in 
1990.^ 
As BOCES' refusal to deduct and transmit agency fees from 
the nonmembers among the accreted employees is a violation of 
§209-a.l(a) of the Act, BOCES is mistaken in its argument that we 
—
xIn reaching this conclusion we are aware that by letter 
decision dated March 25, 1991, Supreme Court, Onondaga County, 
stayed the Federation's demand for arbitration on a grievance 
involving the BOCES' refusal to deduct the agency fees from the 
accreted employees. The Court stayed arbitration on the ground 
that there was no valid agreement to arbitrate the grievance. 
Thus, its decision is not relevant to the disposition of this 
charge because the issues before us are not the same as those 
presented to the Court. 
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have no jurisdiction over this aspect of the Federation's charge 
because its duties are contractual in nature. Section 2 05.5(d) 
of the Act provides that we do not have jurisdiction over 
violations of contract which do not otherwise constitute an 
improper practice. BOCES' obligation to deduct and transmit the 
agency fees is, in part, contractual, but breach of that 
particular contractual obligation falls within our jurisdiction 
because of its necessary interference with the unit employees' 
fundamental statutory rights. 
Our footnoted statement in the representation proceeding 
involving the at-issue employees that "negotiations for the 
existing unit are very unlikely to have contemplated that new 
employees would in the future be covered"—/ is not inconsistent 
with our decision in this case. Our statement in the earlier 
representation proceeding was made only in response to BOCES' 
request for the issuance of a bargaining order. We did not have 
before us at that time any issue as to whether any particular 
contract term applied to persons who were added to the unit after 
the contract was negotiated. 
The Federation's remaining exceptions are denied. BOCES' 
statements during negotiations in opposition to Stanton's being a 
member of the Federation's negotiating team did not violate the 
Act because they were neither threatening nor coercive with 
^Onondaqa-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 23 PERB 53 014, at 3 031 n.8 
(1990). 
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respect to the exercise of employee rights nor did they establish 
a refusal to bargain in good faith. We reach the same conclusion 
with respect to the Federation's allegations which are based 
largely upon the alleged "onerous" nature of BOCES' bargaining 
proposals. Several of BOCES7 proposals called for a reduction in 
the accreted employees7 existing benefits. The Federation also 
alleges that BOCES7 wage proposal was, at best, underdeveloped 
even by the date the parties reached impasse. However, the ALJ 
concluded that BOCES7 proposals were not made in bad faith or in 
an effort to preclude the parties from reaching an agreement. 
Having reviewed the record and the parties7 arguments, we find no 
basis on which to disturb the AKJ7s determination in this 
respect. 
Our findings that BOCES violated the Act by discontinuing 
its annual wage reviews resulting in the denial of $1.00 per 
hour wage increases for the employees who were added to the 
Federation7s unit in 1990 and by refusing to deduct and transmit 
agency shop fees from the nonmembers of the Federation among 
those employees necessitate a consideration of the appropriate 
remedy. In that respect, we have been apprised by the parties 
that in May 1992, they reached a contract covering the employees 
who were accreted to the unit. The contract was made effective 
from July 1, 1990 through June 30, 1992, and it covers both 
wages and agency fees for the at-issue employees. Remedial 
relief with respect to these two issues has been rendered 
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unnecessary by the agreements the parties themselves have 
reached. In that circumstance, we find that a posting of notice 
of violation will fully effectuate the policies of the Act.—7 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that BOCES post notice in the form 
attached at all locations ordinarily used to post notices of 
information to employees in the Federation's unit. 
DATED: June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
IM'V^iW-U Paialine R. Kinsel la , Chairperson 
< ! 
Walter L. Eisenberg, Member 
—''See Arlington Cent. School Dist.
 f 25 PERB f3001 (1992) (appeal 
pending). 
APPENDIX 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify
 a l l employees in the unit represented by the 
Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, 
AFT #2 897 (Federation) that the Onondaga-Cortland-Madison BOCES 
has been found by the Board to have violated §209-a.l(a) and (c) 
of the Act by discontinuing its annual wage review resulting in 
the denial of $1.00 per hour wage increases for certain employees 
who were added to the Federation's unit in 1990 and to have 
violated §209-a.l(a) of the Act by refusing to deduct and 
transmit agency shop fees from the nonmembers of the Federation 
among those employees who were added to the Federation's unit in 
1990. 
OhQhdaga-Cortland-Madison. BOCES 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
3A-06/30/92 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO. 445, IBT, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-3922 
TOWN OF CHESTER, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in . 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Teamsters Local Union No. 
445, IBT has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed 
upon by the parties and described below, as their exclusive 
representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and the 
settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Mechanic, MEO, HEO, water plant operator and 
working foreman. 
Excluded: Managerial and confidential employees and all 
other employees. 
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FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Town of Chester. The duty 
to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet 
at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to 
wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or 
the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement 
incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party. 
Such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a 
proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED:. June 30, 1992 
Albany, New York 
^J.i^p.LifNfitJL 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
t* Z -
Walter L. Eisenberg, ber 
Schmertz, Member 
